This paper studies the e¤ect of …nancial booms and extreme asset valuations on the relative demand for skills and the wage structure. The substantial rise in wage inequality in the U.S. since the late 1970s has been accompanied by a major expansion of …nancial services, a series of asset bubbles, and rising relative wages and relative education in the …nancial industry. I motivate and develop a theoretical framework where …nancial institutions bene…t from …nancial booms and asset bubbles. Yet the complexity and novelty of …nancial products and fundamentals surrounding bubbles favor the supremacy of skilled individuals in exploiting these opportunities. Hence …nancial booms increase opportunities for skilled labor, contributing to the rise in overall wage inequality in the economy. Simple extensions of the basic framework allow us to study the implications of …nancial regulation and globalization of …nancial services, as well as further topics. Finally, the paper documents and compares relative wage and employment patterns in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France, providing suggestive evidence for the theoretical framework.
Introduction
The substantial rise in wage inequality in the U.S. since the late 1970s documented in many studies (e.g. Katz and Autor, 1999; Piketty and Saez, 2003) has been accompanied by a major expansion of the …nancial industry, and a series of asset bubbles including the LBO boom of the 1980s, the dot-com bubble of the 1990s, and the recent credit and housing boom. While the U.K. has experienced a similar surge in inequality, major Continental European economies such as France have not (Katz and Autor, 1999; Piketty, 2007) . Given the prominent role of Wall Street and the City of London in the …nancial booms of the past decades, one wonders whether the …nancial sector and asset bubbles have been contributing factors to the divergent paths of wage inequality. Figure 1a illustrates the strong expansion of the …nancial industry in the U.S. and U.K. over the past decades. Since the late 1970s -around the time of the …nancial deregulations of Reagan and Thatcher -the shares of …nancial intermediation in U.S. and U.K. GDP have risen substantially, while no such trend can be discerned in Continental European economies such as France and Germany. And indeed, the expansion of the …nancial sector has been accompanied by a substantial rise in wage premia earned in …nance compared to non-…nance jobs in the U.S. and in the U.K, while these wage gaps have been stagnating or even slightly receding in France and Germany. 1 Motivated by these patterns, the present paper takes the viewpoint that modern …nancial markets have been characterized by an ever-increasing number of new …nancial structures and recurring phases of extreme asset valuations; which resulted in high fees and increasing rents to be earned in the …nancial sector; and that these features have played an important role in the 1 The …nance/non-…nance wage gaps are calculated using standard wage regressions including the usual controls, see empirical section. Given the di¤erences in data sets across countries, di¤erences in levels should not be overemphasized, and the present analysis focuses on trends. developments of the international wage structure. The paper develops a theory where …nancial institutions bene…t from deregulations and extreme asset valuations. Yet the complexity and novelty of …nancial products and fundamentals surrounding asset bubbles favor the supremacy of certain groups of workers such as the higher-skilled in exploiting these opportunities. Hence …nancial booms increase opportunities for skilled workers in …nancial services, contributing to the rise in overall wage inequality. Simple extensions of the basic framework allow us to study the role of …nancial regulation, the consequences of globalization of …nancial services, and potential drivers of the wage gaps between …nance and non-…nance jobs. The second part of the paper investigates the implications of the model using wage data of advanced OECD countries including the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France.
The basic framework is based on a simple overlapping generations economy with three key ingredients: First, asset bubbles may arise under certain economic conditions. Second, workers di¤er in their skill sets (e.g. educational levels, and in an extension, in other characteristics).
Third and most importantly, deregulation and asset bubbles create rent opportunities in the …nancial sector. The savings and investment process of the economy is organized around …nancial intermediaries, which engage in traditional intermediation, collecting savings from households and lending them to the real production sector. Traditional intermediation is essential for the capital accumulation of the economy but can be standardized to a high degree and consequently yields low fees. Savings can also be channeled into new …nancial structures and asset bubbles. The key assumptions is that this intermediation of bubbles generates high fees and is relatively skill-intensive given the complex nature of new …nancial products and fundamentals surrounding asset bubbles.
The analysis shows that deregulation and the emergence of asset bubbles leads to a growing …nancial sector, higher employment of skilled individuals in the …nancial sector, and higher wage inequality between more-skilled and less-skilled individuals. As more rent opportunities arise for skilled individuals, the …nancial sector absorbs a growing mass of skilled workers, in ‡ating the sector, while lowering real output. The scarcity of skilled individuals in real production drives up their marginal products and wages in the economy.
The framework is used to evaluate the impact of …nancial regulation policy. It can be
shown that stricter regulation of traditional intermediation makes conditions for bubbles less likely, but more importantly, hurts the real sector by lowering the range of capital goods intermediated. On the other hand, stricter regulation of bubble intermediation mitigates the negative e¤ect of rent seeking activities on real output and inequality. A simple two-country extension of the basic model allows us to study the impact of globalization of …nancial markets and services. It can be demonstrated that the country with looser regulation evolves into the leading …nancial center, plagued by higher inequality. Furthermore, increasing returns to scale in intermediation due to local spillovers can turn the e¤ect of initial loose regulation persistent across time. These …ndings will be important when evaluating wage and employment data across …nancially integrated countries such as within Europe. Finally, another simple extension demonstrates how di¤erences in access to rents and in tastes generate growing wage gaps between between …nance and non-…nance jobs in periods of deregulation and in ‡ating bubbles.
The results are in line with a recent empirical study by Philippon and Reshef (2008) . Using wage and employment data for the U.S., they document that "…nancial jobs were relatively skill intensive, complex, and highly paid until the 1930s and after the 1980s, but not in the interim period." Initial calculations of the authors revealed that the …nancial sector contributed about 15-20% to the rise in overall wage inequality in the U.S., thus being an important contributing factor. 2 The model of this paper is consistent with these …ndings as both episodes before the 1930s as well as after the 1980s were marked by signi…cant asset bubbles and light regulation.
Another recent study also …nds that …nancial development increases inequality, while banking crises reduce top income shares of the rich, using a panel of 16 countries over the twentieth century (Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström, 2009).
The second part of the paper extends the still small empirical literature on inequality and the …nancial sector by evaluating wage and employment data of the four largest advanced OECD countries with comparable household survey data available: the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France. The aim is to document and compare wage and employment patterns over the last decades, providing suggestive evidence for the theoretical framework. The U.S. and U.K.
spearheaded the global deregulation of …nancial markets and services starting in the 1970s, 1996) . This paper highlights the role of asset bubbles and …nancial deregulation as important contributing factors to the rise in wage inequality in the U.S. and U.K., and the divergence from Continental Europe.
And …nally, the paper is related to the theoretical literature on the impact of …nancial services on the economy. One strand of theoretical work has stressed the growth promoting e¤ect of …nancial intermediation (e.g. Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991) . On the other hand, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) make the example of trading as a rent seeking activity with negative e¤ects on growth. The present paper evaluates both aspects of the …nancial sector in a single framework: It introduces a simple yet intuitive structure to study traditional intermediation in a macroeconomic context, modelling banks as monopolistic competitive lenders specialized in di¤erent real sectors. And it formalizes rentseeking intermediation with bubbles and loose regulation as sources of rent opportunities in the …nancial sector. Independently of this work, Cahuc and Challe (2009) have developed a similar theoretical framework studying the e¤ects of asset bubbles on occupational choice in the presence of …nancial intermediaries yielding similar results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the key assumptions and mechanisms, and provides an overview of the main …ndings. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework. It then derives and analyzes the equilibrium and conditions for bubbles. Finally, the main results of the model are presented, studying the impact of asset bubbles on labor markets, the role of …nancial regulation, globalization of …nancial services, and …nance/non…nance wage gaps. Section 4 documents and compares wage and employment patterns of the U.S., Germany, U.K., and France, providing suggestive evidence for the theoretical framework.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Financial sector, bubbles, and labor markets: an overview
Financial institutions engage in …nancial intermediation, around which the savings and investment process of the economy is organized. Intermediaries serve the business sector, supplying it with capital; and they serve households, investing their savings. In an economy free of asset bubbles and speculative excesses, …nancial institutions channel the households'savings mainly into businesses. They identify, …nance and monitor entrepreneurs, start-ups as well as mature businesses, and then transform duration, risk and lot sizes of these investments, in order to create suitable savings vehicles for households. This "traditional intermediation" is a crucial element of the capital accumulation and innovation process of an economy.
By channeling savings into investments, however, …nancial institutions are often substantially involved in the creation and in ‡ation of speculative manias and asset bubbles, i.e. in the "intermediation of bubbles". They trade bubbly assets on behalf of clients, create and manage new structures and products, and expand bank credit for clients to invest in the latest trends (see Kindleberger, 1996) . Investors are willing to pay high fees in order to participate in the latest …nancial innovations and investment trends expected to generate more stable or higher returns than traditional investments. And the proprietary trading units of banks and hedge funds can pro…t from these frenzies by acting as counterparties, often both on the up-and downside. In fact, …nancial institutions have every incentive to propagate these products and bubbles as they are able to bene…t handsomely. The share of the …nancial sector in U.S. GDP has risen strongly during the stock market boom of the 1920s and since the 1980s, whereas the share collapsed during the Great Depression and WWII (see Philippon, 2008 Consider the recent housing and securitization boom. A myriad of structures has been created to invest in credit and mortgages, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), asset-backed commercial paper conduits (ABCPs), and structured investment vehicles (SIVs).
The underlying credits were pooled and structured, and the tranches of these pools recycled in yet further structures. Revenues of …nancial institutions soared, but they had to employ hoards of mathematicians, IT engineers and quantitative …nance specialists to handle these highly complex transactions. The bubbles also created vast pro…t opportunities for principal trading units and hedge funds by taking proprietary exposures, lurring many graduates from top universities as well as talent from other sectors into …nancial services. As the Economist put it well, "…nance beguiled the bright and ambitious and put them to work in the trading rooms of Wall Street and the City of London." 3 The resulting impact of asset bubbles and …nancial deregulation on the wage structure can be best demonstrated with a simple supply and demand framework borrowed from the literature on educational wage di¤erentials (e.g. Katz and Autor, 1999) . Consider a real production sector with a Cobb-Douglas production function,
using less-skilled labor (high school equivalent), U t , and more-skilled labor (college equivalent), H t . A t is a general productivity parameter, while and 1 represent skill-speci…c productivity parameters. Let us introduce a …nancial sector that absorbs rents through the intermediation of bubbles (B t ) according to R t = B t using skilled labor. 4 It will be shown in the next section that the skill premium in this economy amounts to
Economist, January 24th 2009. 4 I abstract from capital and traditional intermediation for the moment. The next section will explain the …nancial sector in more details.
Similar to skill-biased technical change in the basic framework (lowering ), bubbles drive up the skill premium in the economy. Bubbles increase opportunities for skilled workers in …nancial intermediation which reduces skilled labor in real production, raising the marginal product and compensation of skills in the economy. The rise in wage inequality due to bubbles depends on the amount of rents that can be apprehended, , which is determined by factors such as …nancial regulation and the relative advantage of a country in intermediation.
The next section introduces a model that generates a similar reduced form which allows us to study the impact of bubbles and …nancial intermediation, the role of …nancial regulation and globalization, as well as further topics, in more detail.
Model

Description of the model
Let me brie ‡y outline the key ingredients of the model, before proceeding to a fuller description:
OLG and bubbles: The structure follows the basic overlapping generations (OLG) models with neoclassical production and capital accumulation. The OLG is the simplest intertemporal general equilibrium framework that generates conditions under which rational asset bubbles may arise (see Tirole, 1985 ; Santos and Woodford, 1997). 5 Skilled and unskilled workers: Individuals are endowed with heterogeneous skills.
There are two groups of individuals, which are labelled "skilled" and "unskilled". Skilled individuals should be interpreted as possessing superior analytical capabilities and/or having enjoyed higher education (e.g. college degree or higher). Unskilled individuals have no such special analytical abilities, and are less educated.
Financial intermediation: Channeling savings into investments requires intermediation services of a …nancial sector. Financial institutions may engage in traditional intermediation channeling savings into businesses, …nancing capital needs, and they may engage in intermediation of bubbles, channeling savings into asset bubbles. As motivated in Section 2, the technology of …nancial intermediation of bubbles is assumed to be more skill-intensive than traditional intermediation (and real production), since handling the complex and novel nature of fundamentals surrounding bubbles requires a high analytical skill set. Whereas traditional intermediation is essential to capital accumulation, intermediation of bubbles is not in our framework. The latter is modelled as a pure rent-seeking activity, where skilled individuals 5 I am convinced that most bubbles contain signi…cant elements of irrationality. But since this paper is mostly concerned with the impact of bubbles on labor markets -rather than the causes of bubbles -I chose the simpler route of a rational framework.
can join the …nancial sector to apprehend rents created by asset bubbles. 6 
Endowments, preferences, and technology
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals who live for two periods, and only work when they are young. There are L individuals in each generation (no population growth).
Each young individual is endowed either with one unit of skilled labor or with one unit of unskilled labor. There are uL unskilled and hL = (1 u)L skilled workers, with u 2 (0; 1).
Individuals have logarithmic utility functions in consumption, 
The consumption good is produced by a competitive real sector, using capital and labor, with the following (Cobb-Douglas) production function:
U Y t and H Y t denote total employment of unskilled and skilled workers in the real sector, respectively, and A t the level of labor-augmenting, skill-neutral technology. There is a continuum of di¤erentiated capital goods K t (j) of mass N t available to the real sector. (> 1) parametrizes the importance of using a variety of machines, whereas parametrizes the overall importance of capital in production. A t grows exogenously at rate g,
The …nal good can be turned reversibly into capital goods with the technology k t+1 (j) =
Firms in the real sector rent capital and labor at market prices, maximizing pro…ts. However, …rms cannot …nance themselves directly. They need to …nance/lease capital goods through …nancial intermediaries.
Traditional …nancial intermediation
Financial intermediaries collect savings from individuals, and lend these savings to the real production sector, …nancing capital goods. The …nancial sector consists of a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediaries with measure N t , each specialized in a di¤erent type of capital good j. One should think of …nancial intermediaries being specialized in di¤erent sectors, acquiring di¤erentiated expertise and relationships speci…c to their sectors covered.
Individuals cannot lend directly to the real sector (or search and monitoring is prohibitively expensive), and thus turn to the …nancial sector to deposit and invest their savings.
Financial intermediaries need to employ a …xed amount of 1 units of unskilled labor in each period to be able to operate, that is to build the required expertise, relationships and infrastructure. 7 Intermediaries set lease rates, r F t (j), and …nance themselves at the prevailing market rate on savings, r t , on deposits from individuals in order to maximize pro…ts,
w u t is the wage rate of unskilled labor. Demand for …nancing of capital good j is driven by the …rst-order conditions in the real sector with respect to capital good j,
Note that the …nal good is chosen as numéraire. Financial intermediaries optimally set lease rates according to the …rst-order condition
determines the pricing power of …nancial intermediaries. The higher , the higher is the spread intermediaries can charge on top of interest rates accruing to depositors. can be thought of as a general measure of market power in the traditional …nancial sector, while measures productivity. The higher , the lower are entry barriers into …nancial intermediation.
Pro…t ‡ow for …nancial intermediary j in period t thus amounts to
In each period, intermediaries must decide whether to operate (and incur the …xed costs of employing 1 units of unskilled labor) and, if they operate, must select a sector. Since …xed costs must be incurred in every period, intermediaries'entry decisions a¤ect only the current period. Note the analogy of …nancial intermediaries to capital good monopolists with …xed costs, which generates a simple yet intuitive structure to model the traditional …nancial sector.
Banks face high …xed costs to build infrastructure, expertise and relationships, which are to a large extend speci…c to sectors. Once these investments are made, marginal costs of increasing lending volumes are comparatively small. As a result, banks specialize in certain sectors and products in line with empirical observations. 8 Finally note that the presence of a traditional …nancial sector and whether it is competitive or not is not crucial for our key results that asset bubbles and …nancial deregulation increase wage inequality in the economy. Nevertheless, it allows a more comprehensive view of the …nancial sector and …nancial regulation.
Bubbles and …nancial intermediation
Asset prices might deviate from market fundamentals in an OLG economy (see Tirole, 1985) .
Even in a rational, perfect foresight equilibrium, deviations from fundamentals can persist under certain economic conditions. I denote the sum of this aggregate deviations by B t , the aggregate bubble. As motivated in Section 2, the complex and novel nature of fundamentals surrounding bubbles creates ample room for uncertainties and discrepancies in valuations.
Hence, suppose that capital good sectors in our economy that are more complex, are more susceptible to bubbles than traditional sectors. (Although technological progress is exogenous in our economy, one can imagine that in an economy with an expanding variety of capital goods, the newer sectors are less understood and thus tend to be the sectors with larger valuation discrepancies, e.g. the internet sector.) The aggregate bubble in the economy consists of the valuation discrepancies across sectors,
One can think of these bubbles as paper assets attached to a given capital good sector j, which are intrinsically worthless, but valued positively due to sustainable expectations of future growth in value. 9 The complex nature of bubbles favors the supremacy of skilled individuals in exploiting opportunities around such distortions. Skilled workers can collect rents from bubbles according to the following technology:
where is an exogenous fraction of the bubble that can be absorbed by skilled workers each period, and H F t denotes total skilled labor engaged in …nancial intermediation of bubbles. The larger the bubbles, the more rent opportunities are available to skilled individuals. The more skilled individuals are already engaged in bubble intermediation, however, the less each individual earns. A skilled worker can collect a share of the total rent proportional to its relative e¤ort, 1=H F t . Intermediation of bubbles is attractive if rent opportunities exceed opportunity costs of w h t from being employed in the real sector. Bubbles are always intermediated in the case of > 0, since a skilled worker could apprehend the entire rent with an arbitrarily small e¤ort if bubbles were not yet intermediated.
The simple rent-seeking technology with an exogenous fraction of bubbles that can be absorbed re ‡ects the observed fee structure in the …nancial sector. Transaction and management fees of banks and hedge funds are often …xed percentages on loan and asset volumes, especially in the more innovative, less competitive segments. Hence banks bene…t from in ‡ating asset valuations in the economy. Finally, aggregate bubbles are exogenous and deterministic in the basic framework. Appendix B outlines an extension with stochastic bubbles that may burst and a technology with which skilled individuals are able to create new bubbles.
Savings, investments, and labor markets
Logarithmic utility in the OLG model gives rise to the familiar aggregate savings function,
These savings are deposited at …nancial intermediaries, which channel them into investments,
that is capital for the real sector and bubbles. Individuals are willing to invest in both types of investments if they yield the same return net of intermediation fees,
Since bubbles do not pay any dividends, the aggregate bubble must grow at the rate of interest net of intermediation fees, .
Finally, aggregate supply of unskilled and skilled labor is equal to uL and hL = (1 u)L, respectively, as individuals inelastically supply one unit of labor. Aggregate demand for unskilled labor is the sum of market demands to produce consumption goods (U Y t ) and provide …nancial intermediation for capital goods (U F t ). Aggregate demand for skilled labor is the sum of market demands to produce consumption goods (H Y t ) and to capture rents by providing intermediation for bubbles (H F t ). Labor market clearing requires
Wages are determined by marginal products in real production,
Solution of the model
We are now ready to study the decentralized equilibrium of the economy described in the previous section, summarized by the following de…nition:
De…nition 1 An equilibrium in our economy is a sequence of prices and allocations such that (a) individuals maximize utility given asset holdings of the initial old generation at time
We can combine this condition with the lease rate setting rule, the demand for capital goods, and wages (equations 2, 3 and 10) to obtain
which is constant over time. As the share accruing to capital grows at the same rate as wages (given Cobb-Douglas technology), the revenue base and …xed operating costs of …nancial intermediaries grow at the same rate for a given N . Thus N does not need to adjust to keep the free entry condition full…lled. N is increasing in the price setting power ( ) and productivity ( ) of traditional intermediation.
Next, real production technology can be simpli…ed to
where
Setting savings equal to investments (equations 6 and 7, setting B t = 0 for all j) yields the fundamental law of motion of our OLG economy with a …nancial sector but without bubbles:
Note that without a …nancial sector (by setting N = 1, = 1, and = 1) our economy collapses to the familiar canonical OLG equilibrium with Cobb-Douglas technology and logarithmic preferences. For a given N , the …nancial sector reduces real production as resources are needed in intermediation. On the other hand, it increases the labor share in income, as part of the capital income ‡ows into wages to compensate intermediation services of the young.
The steady state with k t+1 = k t = k is determined by:
An increase in the price setting power of the …nancial sector ( ) increases the variety of capital goods intermediated (N ), which raises real output and the savings rate for a given level of capital. 10 However, it may lower capital in the long run, k. Computations have revealed both cases where k either decreases or increases as a result, depending on parameter values. Even if k decreases, computations have never produced a case where long run output, y, su¤ers from a rise in . Raising productivity of the …nancial sector ( ) has similar e¤ects as a rise in .
Variety of capital goods and output both increase, whereas the savings rate is lowered, for given k t . Computations never revealed cases where savings for a given k t decrease as a result. To sum up, strengthening the traditional …nancial sector (by increasing and/or ) is bene…cial for real output and wages, through the positive e¤ect of raising the variety of intermediated capital goods. The e¤ect on aggregate capital income accruing to the old, y= , on the other hand, depends on whether the positive e¤ect of the output expansion outweighs the negative e¤ect of higher markups. Computations have revealed both cases.
Finally, consider the e¤ect on interest rates accruing to depositors in the steady state,
which is equal to the marginal product of capital goods less the markup for intermediation.
While the marginal product of capital may rise or fall due to increasing , the net interest rate, r, falls in all computations. Like in the standard OLG model, the marginal product of capital is an important element of the economic conditions under which bubbles may arise. Not surprisingly, …nancial intermediation plays an important role, too, in shaping these conditions.
Equilibrium with bubbles
Individuals are willing to invest in bubbles as well as productive capital if both assets yield the same return net of intermediation costs, see equation (8) . Hence, bubbles must grow according
as bubbles do not pay out any dividends, and …nancial intermediation rents ( ) must be covered. However, if bubbles grew faster than the economy in the long run, they could not arise in the …rst place because bubbles which outgrow the economy are not sustainable. Thus bubbles can only arise if their growth rate is (equal to or) lower than the growth rate of the economy in the long run, lim t!1 B t+1 =B t 1 + g. Similar to the canonical OLG model without …nancial intermediation, bubbles can only arise if marginal productivity of capital ( r F ) is su¢ ciently low: 11
In contrast to the canonical model, however, the marginal product must not be lower than the growth rate if pricing power in traditional intermediation is su¢ ciently high. On the other hand, a marginal product lower than economic growth does not necessarily generate conditions 1 1 Starting in the bubbleless steady-state, k, bubbles crowd out part of the capital, increasing the return on capital, rt+1 > r F . Hence, bubbles can only arise if the marginal product of capital in the bubbleless steady-state is su¢ ciently low.
for bubbles if rents in intermediation of bubbles are su¢ ciently high. Since lowers net interest rates, bubbles are more likely to arise if market power in traditional intermediation is high.
On the other hand, bubbles are less likely to arise if rents in intermediation of bubbles are too high. See Appendix A for more details on welfare, dynamic e¢ ciency, and conditions for bubbles.
In an equilibrium with bubbles, it is always attractive for skilled individuals to apprehend rents (see equation 5), hence wages in the real sector must re ‡ect this opportunity,
Jointly with marginal productivity in the real sector and labor market clearing (equations 9 and 10), this condition determines relative employment of skilled in the real and …nancial sector, respectively:
The capital accumulation equation in the presence of bubbles thus becomes:
The accumulation equation is similar to the one above, except that now the aggregate bubble absorbs part of the savings, lowers real output as resources are redeployed in intermediation of bubbles, and drives up wages of skilled workers, increasing the savings rate.
The accumulation equation jointly with the no-arbitrage condition, equation (8),
describe the dynamic system of the economy with bubbles. The equilibrium can best be illustrated with a phase diagram borrowed from Tirole (1985) and Weil (1987) , see Figure 2 .
There is an "asymptotically bubbly equilibrium" where the bubble grows at the same rate as the economy in the long run, and thus the bubble per e¢ ciency units converges tob and capital tok. If the bubble starts below this asymptotically bubbly path, the economy eventually converges to the "asymptotically bubbleless" steady state, which corresponds to the steady state from above, with k and b = 0. Since in that case the capital stock remains relatively high with bubbles absorbing relatively little savings, interest rates remain comparatively low, and thus the bubble grows relatively slowly, and ultimately becomes marginal compared to the economy. Bubbles cannot start above the asymptotically bubbly path, as they would end up outgrowing the economy, leading to negative capital. 
Interpretation of the model
Let us proceed to the content of the model. The impact of asset bubbles on labor markets in our economy can be summarized by the following proposition: Proposition 1 Given the described economy, asset bubbles (b t ) increase opportunities for skilled workers in the …nancial sector (h F t ), leading to a rise in wage inequality in the economy as relative wages of skilled workers (w h t =w u t ) are pushed up.
The relative wages of skilled workers can be readily calculated (using equations 10 and 14),
Demand for skilled workers in …nancial services is given by
It is straightforward to verify the proposition.
Note that taking logs of the relative wages generates a very similar reduced form as the one shown in Section 2:
using equations (11) and (15) . The more skilled workers the …nancial sector absorbs relative to unskilled workers, the lower is the relative ratio of skilled workers in the real sector (h Y t =u Y t ), and thus the higher their relative marginal products and wages. Bubbles create rent opportunities in the …nancial sector, attracting skilled individuals, which increases their wages and employment in the …nancial sector, while wages and employment of unskilled workers remain less a¤ected.
The role of …nancial regulation
Financial regulation subjects …nancial institutions to certain requirements and restrictions, shaping the opportunity set in which the …nancial sector operates. Financial regulation thus has important implications for our results.
Let us view …nancial regulation policy in our framework as a triplet Traditional intermediation is important for the proliferation of a broad variety of innovations. Weakening traditional intermediation decreases the range of intermediated capital goods that are available to the real sector, lowering real output. As a consequence, net interest rates increase and savings decrease, lowering the likelihood of conditions and maximum size of bubbles, however at the cost of lower real production. Loosely speaking, the "price" of innovation, partially enabled by …nancial intermediation, is increased complexity in fundamentals, favoring the emergence of bubbles. Restricting traditional intermediation lowers innovation and capital in the economy, and thus complexity and the likelihood of bubbles. The disadvantages of too strict a regulation, that is of less innovation and capital, however, clearly outweigh the bene…ts of less bubbles.
Restrictive regulation of intermediation of bubbles reduces wage inequality in a bubbly economy. Since rent seeking absorbs skilled workers, redistributing income and reducing real output without creating any social bene…t, restrictive regulation of these activities is certainly more appropriate. In the real world the distinction between fundamental intermediation and rent seeking activities unfortunately is often not that easy. Regulators thus face the di¢ cult task to …nd the delicate balance between curbing excesses while not choking o¤ an important engine of the economy.
Globalization of …nancial markets and services
Consider a simple two-country extension of our model, with the two countries home and abroad (marked with an asterisk). Let us assume perfect capital (and bubble) mobility, no trading costs for consumption goods and …nancial intermediation services, and immobile labor markets.
The two countries are identical, except that the …nancial sector abroad has an advantage in capturing rents of bubbles:
with a > a. The advantage in intermediation of bubbles translates into higher wage inequality abroad:
Corollary 2 Given the described two-country set-up, the country with an advantage in capturing rents from intermediation of bubbles experiences a steeper rise in wage inequality and …nancial sector employment of skilled workers if bubbles arise in any of the two countries.
The di¤erence in wages of skilled workers between abroad and home is driven by the advantage of abroad in capturing rents of bubbles:
If a is su¢ ciently low compared to a , employment of skilled workers in intermediation at home is zero, H F t = 0. Since wages of skilled workers are higher abroad, employment of skilled workers in intermediation is higher and in real production lower than at home. Thus wages of unskilled workers abroad tend to be lower as well. However, lower wages create an advantage for traditional intermediation abroad, partially or fully keeping up wages for unskilled at the levels of home. 12 Hence, the country with the advantage in intermediation of bubbles, experiences 1 2 Wages of unskilled workers abroad are equal or smaller than wages at home, w
higher wage inequality and a larger …nancial sector if bubbles arise. Consequently, the other country has a larger real sector (with more labor and capital).
The advantage of a country in intermediation of bubbles may be driven by its (less strict) …nancial regulation policy, or by increasing returns to scale (IRS) due to local spillovers in intermediation of bubbles:
Traders and bankers clearly bene…t from the proximity to each other because of (in-)formal networks, multitude of outside opportunities, vicinity to market action and sentiment, and other factors. For example, the majority of large European investment banks have centralized their more complex trading, structuring, advisory, and originating activities in London.
In the case of IRS, multiple equilibria arise, and thus history and expectations help determining …nal outcomes. The country with a head start in intermediation (or the country expected to become a …nancial center) ends up being the predominant …nancial center of a region. The set of …nancial regulation policy in the critical stage of …nancial development is decisive in this case. For London and New York most certainly both regulation and increasing returns play an important role in their dominance as …nancial centers which will be discussed in the empirical section in more detail.
On the …nance/non…nance wage gap
Finally, the empirical evidence presented in the introduction (also see next section) indicates that individuals with similar levels of education, experience, and other relevant characteristics seem to earn a signi…cant premium by working in the …nancial sector as opposed to non…nancial sectors in the last decades, and that this premium has increased in the past years.
How can we account for such a wage gap in our framework?
With the total rent being shared among …nanciers participating in intermediation of bubbles, insiders already engaged in intermediation have an incentive to protect their rents from new entrants. Alternatively, certain …nanciers have better access to such rents through (family) relationships, networks, and other dispositions. As a consequence, the ability to capture rents varies across skilled individuals,
I determines a cuto¤ below which skilled individuals do not participate in rent seeking. The higher (i), the higher is the share of the rent a person i I is allocated due to better access.
Hence during a …nancial boom the wage gap between the average skilled individual working in …nance and a skilled individual working in non-…nance widens.
One could think of further labor market frictions and (potentially unobserved) heterogeneities that would lead to rising …nance/non-…nance wage gaps in times of booming …nancial markets.
Summary of results and empirical implications
In preparation for the empirical investigation, let us brie ‡y summarize the main results of our theoretical framework: First, the global opportunity set for skilled individuals in …nancial intermediation is driven by the interaction of asset bubbles and …nancial regulation. The emergence of asset bubbles increases wage inequality and …nancial sector employment of skilled labor, and the rise is reinforced by …nancial deregulation (i.e. looser regulation). 
International evidence
This section evaluates wage and employment data of the four largest advanced OECD countries with comparable household survey data available: the U.S., Germany, U.K., and France. 14 The aim is to document and compare the development of wage and employment structures over the past decades, providing suggestive evidence for the theoretical framework discussed above. 
A brief history of …nancial regulation and …nancial centers
According to our framework, the demand and rent opportunities for skilled individuals in …nan- exchange controls were stopped in the U.K. Barth et al. 2008) industry in the U.S., which contributed to the subsequent S&L crisis, and sawed some of the seeds for the recent housing boom (e.g. allowed adjustable rate mortgages). Starting in the 1980s, the Glass-Steagall Act which separated commercial and investment banking in the U.S.
was gradually dismantled and …nally repealed in 1999. The U.K. followed suit with the "Big The head start of Wall Street and the City of London translated into persistent advantages due to a critical amassment of …nancial activity. As discussed above, traders and bankers bene…t from proximity to each other due to (in-)formal networks, multitude of outside opportunities, and vicinity to market action and sentiment. Futhermore, the two cities o¤er other advantages to …nancial …rms such as a multitude of international air links, telecommunications networks, English as o¢ cial language, robust …nancial exchanges, and deep and multinational talent pools. 17 A recent survey of senior …nancial services professionals on the competitiveness of …nancial centers ranked London and New York City clearly ahead of Frankfurt and Paris. 18 The advantages of the U.S. and U.K. in …nancial intermediation manifest themselves in the relative levels of …nancial activity. As shown in Figure 4 , the share of …nancial intermediation in GDP is substantially larger in the Anglo-Saxon economies than in Germany and France, and has widened over the past decades. The share in the U.S. has doubled since the mid 4.2 Wage and employment structure in the …nancial sector Figure 6 plots the (log of the) relative wage of workers employed in …nancial intermediation to workers employed in other sectors over time. 20 In the U.S., the …nance/non-…nance wage gap started to increase substantially in the 1980s, around the time of the deregulation initiated by Reagan (see also Philippon and Reshef, 2008) . The rise was brie ‡y interrupted during the S&L crisis, and reached a …rst peak at the height of the dot-com bubble. Retracing somewhat thereafter, the gap widened again during the recent housing and securitization boom. The U.K. shows a similar pattern around the recent peaks in valuation. In contrast to the U.S., the wage gap in France and Germany have been relatively stable over the past two decades.
The left panel of Figure 7 shows the share of higher-educated workers (college equivalent) who were employed by the …nancial sector. The share has been sharply rising in the U.S.,
indicating that the …nancial sector has increased demand for skills in the U.S. economy. In the U.K. the picture is less clear. In France it rather has been receding over the past decades.
However, in Germany the share has been rising, too. The corresponding share of lower-educated workers has been trending down both in the U.S., U.K., and France, yet in Germany it has increased somewhat, too.
The development of …nance/non-…nance wage gaps and employment structures suggest that …nancial sector employees, especially with higher education, have been strongly bene…ting in the era of deregulation and …nancial booms in the U.S. In U.K. the picture is less clear, however the wage premium in …nance has rather increased over the past year. In France, there is no evidence that the …nancial sector has increased wages in …nance and demand for skills, in line with the rather stationary wage inequality over the past decades. In Germany, the evidence 2 0 The relative wages are estimated with cross-section log weekly earnings regressions on the …nancial sector dummy, controlling for education, a quartic in experience, regions, sex and race, interactions between sex, race, and experience. Given the di¤erences in data sets across countries, di¤erences in levels should not be overemphasized, and the present analysis focuses on trends. is mixed. While …nance dummies have come down somewhat, …nancial sector employment of skills has strongly increased, possibly putting upward pressure on wages of skilled individuals.
Overall wage and employment structure
Many studies have documented the rise in wage inequality in the U.S. and to some extent in the U.K. since the 1980s (see Introduction). Figure 8 shows the college/high school wage gap. 21 In the U.S. the college/HS gap has increased substantially over time, although the relative supply of educated workers has been increasing, as well, since the 1970s. In contrast to the U.S., the development in France has been relatively ‡at to decreasing. This pattern is in line with other comparative studies on wage inequality (e.g. Piketty, 2007) . In the U.K. the trend is rather increasing. And in Germany, the college premium has stayed relatively ‡at (in 
weighing generations proportionally to technical progress, with c 1;t and c 2;t denoting consumption per e¢ ciency units (let's abstract from skilled and unskilled for the moment). The resource constraint on the planner is given by
+ c 1;t + c 2;t ; with
First-order conditions with regards to c 2;t , k t , and N t , respectively, are
The steady state is characterized by c 1;t 1 = c 1;t = c 1 . Not surprisingly, N , the optimum range of goods intermediated, is larger that in the decentral equilibrium, cf. expression (11) :
The economy is dynamically ine¢ cient if
Let's compare this golden-rule to the condition under which bubbles may arise in the decentral equilibrium,
Traditional …nancial intermediation lowers the range of capital goods used by the real sector, N < N , lowering output per variety, y=N . For a given N , markups in traditional intermediation, , lower the hurdle level. Hence, bubbles may arise although the economy appears to be dynamically e¢ cient (using gross rates of return) if markups are high. On the other hand, rents in bubble intermediation, , raise the hurdle, making bubbles less likely to occur. Overall, bubbles may increase dynamic e¢ cienty, in line with the standard OLG model, however, the resulting rent opportunities may lower e¢ ciency given the drain of skills in real production.
B. Cycles of bubbles and inequality Consider two extensions to our basic framework.
First, the aggregate bubble might burst with an exogenous probability (1 q) next period.
Second, skilled individuals are able to create new bubbles. The extended framework generates cycles of bubbles with elevated inequality.
Assume that the aggregate bubble might burst with exogenous probability (1 q), see Weil Using the FOCs one can show that the aggregate bubbles must grow according to the following no-arbitrage condition:
and that, additionally using budget constraints, the aggregate demand for capital and bubbles per e¢ ciency units is given by
The bubble cannot grow faster than the growth rate of the economy in the long run as there would be a positive probability that the bubble outgrows the economy in …nite time, lim t!1 (1+ t+1 ) (1 + g). Given risk aversion, a bubbly equilibrium thus exists if and only if
The expected growth factor of the bubble net of intermediation fees must be strictly larger than the interest factor in the bubbleless steady-state. Hence bubbles cannot be too risky, see Weil (1987) .
Given conditions under which bubbles might arise, bubbles can be created by skilled workers with technology
with the function F : R 2 + ! R + being linearly homogeneous. A skilled individual can create an intrinsically worthless paper asset with an initial value proportional to the existing size of bubbles and capital in the economy. Imagine that like during the dot-com bubble era of the late 1990s, university graduates can set up and sell new (e.g. internet-based) companies that have never produced tangible revenues. Skilled individuals pursue these opportunities if the payo¤s are greater than wages in real production (and intermediation of bubbles),
In this case, aggregate bubbles (per e¢ ciency unit) grow according to
as new bubbles are created each period, until bubble creation is no longer attractive, or the aggregate bubble reaches the ceiling of the asymptotic bubbly path. 23 Assume that the economy starts at t = 1 without bubbles, b 0 = 0, conditions for bubbles prevail, and bubble creation is su¢ ciently attractive,
For example, deregulation could shift up the function F such that bubble creation becomes attractive. Hence, wages of skilled individuals adjust upwards in order to equalize rewards across bubble creation, bubble intermediation, and real production, In an economy characterized by high savings and low interest rates, there is a high demand for new investment opportunities. Smart individuals might exploit this demand by creating new investment opportunities, such as the latest dot-com start-up or CDO squared, especially if opportunities in the "real economy" are not su¢ ciently attractive. In such an environment, one bubble might chase the next, keeping wage inequality at elevated levels.
C. Data and construction 2 3 Creation of bubbles in excess of the upper bound on the aggregate bubble would render all existing bubbles worthless, and thus is not worthwile to pursue. However, one best assumes that bubble creation becomes su¢ ciently di¢ cult before we reach the upper bound such that it becomes unattractive, in order to have a well-de…ned equilibrium (with no incentives to deviate for single skilled individuals). 
Data sources and construction
The wage and employment data comes from a variety of surveys such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the U.S. Processing of the CPS data set will serve as benchmark, with data from other countries processed as similarly as possible. See Appendix C for more details on data and construction.
Note that quality of data and documentation varies across countries. After proper selection, CPS and LFS (France) contain around 30'000 or more observations for each year, whereas the other countries have substantially less (around 5'000 observations). Independently of data issues, since systems of education vary substantially across countries, we focus on college graduates versus lower educational achievements which is most similar across country (see Figure 10 ). In wage regressions we use a similar granularity for controlling education across countries. Finally, the …nancial sector dummy includes …nance (including banking, savings institutions, credit, securities, commodities, funds, trusts) and insurance. Patterns using hourly wages are very similar to patterns using weekly wages (both calculated from annual wage information Selection is similar to CPS. Hourly wages are used. As no national minimum wage exists (sector-speci…c minimum wages), a similar fraction of the lowest wages are dropped as for
U.S.: The March
CPS.
France: The Labor Force Survey (enquête emploi) is used, covering 1990-2007. Selection is similar to CPS. Hourly wages are used. Full minimum wage used as cut-o¤ leading to similar fraction of observations dropped as for CPS.
